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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 920778-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 2

JAMES C. QUADA,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from judgments and convictions by a jury
of evading, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 74-6-13.5 (1988); and resisting arrest, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1991).

Addendum

A.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was the length and scope of the detention unlawful?

This Court need not reach the merits of this issue because it was
not preserved below, exceptions to the waiver doctrine are not
argued on appeal, defense counsel's brief does not conform with
rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and defendant's pro
se brief is not useful to this Court's consideration of the
issue.

Hence, no standard of review applies.
2.

Did Deputy Pickup violate defendant's fourth

amendment rights by stopping him for a speeding violation?

There

is no standard of review applicable to this issue as this Court
need not reach the merits for the reasons provided in issue
number 1, supra.
3(a).

Was defendant denied effective assistance of

trial counsel due to counsel's failure to raise five substantive
issues at trial?

This Court need not reach this issue as the

threshold requirements have not been met for raising it for the
first time on direct appeal. Alternatively, this Court must
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so,
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant under the
test set forth in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
(b).

Has defendant been denied effective assistance of

either trial or appellate counsel due to a conflict of interest?
When a defendant raises a conflict of interest for the first time
on appeal, this Court must determine whether an actual conflict
exists which adversely affect counsel's performance.

See State

v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); see also State v. Johnson,
823 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991).
4.

Was defendant deprived of a constitutional right to

a twelve-person jury?

Because this issue is not properly before

this Court, there is no applicable standard of review.
5.

Did either defendant's arrest or the subsequent

impound of his vehicle constitute an unlawful bill of attainder?
As with previous issues, there is no applicable standard of
review as the issue is not properly before this Court.
2

6.

Was the jury properly instructed concerning their

duty to^ follow the law?

This issue was waived, and no standard

of review is applicable on appeal.

However, should this Court

reach the merits of this issue, it will reverse based on an
improper jury instruction only where defendant demonstrates
prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.
State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd. on
other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); State v. McCumber. 622
P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), abrogated on other grounds. State v.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).

The precise wording and

specificity contained in an instruction is left to the trial
court's sound discretion, so long as the instruction does not
misstate material rules of law.

State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554,

560 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of any relevant constitutional, statutory, or
rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained either in the body or the
appendix of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant James C. Quada was charged by information
with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990); evading, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1988); and resisting
arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-305 (Supp. 1991) (R. 1-2). At trial, the court granted
3

defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated assault
based on the State's failure to establish a prima facie case (R.
84).

The jury found defendant guilty on the remaining two

charges (R. 80-81).
Defendant refused to report to AP&P for preparation of
the presentence report (R. 82-83, 89-90).

The court received an

abbreviated report, then sentenced defendant to serve an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison for the evading conviction, and six months in the Utah
County Jail for resisting arrest (R. 92-93).
Defendant timely filed an appeal, seeking reversal of
his convictions.

Defense counsel filed an appellate brief, after

which this Court permitted defendant to file a supplemental pro
se brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the evening of February 5, 1992, Deputy John
Pickup was running traffic radar on county road 8170 North, west
of American Fork, Utah (Trial Transcript [hereinafter "Tr."] 12628).

Deputy Pickup was driving westbound in a 40 mile-per-hour

zone shortly before 10:00 p.m. when he noticed a solitary 1974
Pinto station wagon driving toward him at a speed he estimated to
be 55 miles per hour (Tr. 126, 128, 130, 135, 150, 163, 237).
His radar clocked the car at 53 miles per hour (Tr. 164). The
deputy turned his car around, activated his lights and siren, and
pulled the Pinto to the side of the road (Tr. 130, 135-36, 20708, 226)•
4

Deputy Pickup approached the driver's window, intending
to explain to the driver that animals and children frequently use
the road and that he should slow down (Tr. 131, 163-64).

The

deputy requested that the driver produce a driver's license and
vehicle registration (Tr. 137, 208). Defendant, the sole
occupant of the Pinto, opened only the top few inches of the
window and passed the documents to the deputy (Tr. 135, 137, 20708, 226). The deputy return to his car and relayed the license
information to dispatch pursuant to department policy to verify
the license and to check for outstanding warrants (Tr. 132, 139).
Dispatch notified him that the computer showed an outstanding
arrest warrant for defendant out of Lehi County (Tr. 140, 165).
As required by department policy, dispatch then contacted Officer
James Munson of the Lehi County Sheriff's Office to request that
he personally verify the validity of the warrant (Tr. 132-33,
140, 165, 234) . After he verified the warrant as valid, Officer
Munson drove to the location where Deputy Pickup had stopped
defendant (Tr. 165, 234-35).
Once Deputy Pickup was informed of the warrant's
validity, he was required by department policy to enforce the
warrant (Tr. 189). When Officer Munson arrived, Deputy Pickup
again approached defendant's car, explained that a warrant had
been issued for his arrest, and requested that defendant get out
of the car (Tr. 141-43, 166, 208-09, 236-37, 250). Defendant
refused (Tr. 144-45, 208, 226). After several ineffective
requests and a warning that he would use force if necessary, the
5

deputy returned to his car to get his "slim jim" in order to open
the locked car doors (Tr. 144-45, 167-68, 238) -1 At the same
time, Officer Munson, who had originally positioned himself on
the passenger side of the Pinto, moved to the front of the car
near the fender on the driver's side (Tr. 142, 145, 228, 236-37,
239).

Defendant started his car and began to move onto the

roadway (Tr. 168-69, 209, 228, 239-40).

Officer Munson backed

away from the moving car and yelled to Deputy Pickup that
defendant was leaving (Tr. 146-47, 170). He also motioned to
defendant to stop, telling him that he was under arrest and could
not leave (Tr. 147, 240). Defendant continued toward Officer
Munson as the officer backed away into the eastbound lane of the
road until the officer was finally forced to leap over the front
fender of defendant's car to avoid being hit (Tr. 148-49, 171-74,
190-91, 240) . Defendant accelerated away from the scene (Tr.
149, 228-29, 241).
Deputy Pickup jumped in his car and followed defendant,
with Officer Munson behind him, the lights and sirens of both
police vehicles fully activated (Tr. 149-50, 154-55, 192, 217,
242).

Defendant led the officers approximately one mile east

where he turned onto another county road toward American Fork
(Tr. 151a, 211, 242) . Deputy Pickup used his radar to determine
that defendant reached 50 miles per hour before he turned off

1

The deputy described his "slim jim" as a thin metal device,
approximately eighteen inches long, which slides inside a car door
through the crack where the window retracts and enables an officer
to unlock the door from the outside (Tr. 167-68).
6

county road 8170 North (Tr. 151-52, 158). The second county road
had a posted speed of 25 miles per hour and took the trio down
the main street of American Fork (Tr. 155-56, 176). According to
Deputy Pickup's radar, defendant reached slightly over 50 miles
per hour, swerving around the slower traffic in front of him and
around parked cars, and causing a number of cars to stop suddenly
or to swerve (Tr. 153-56, 245).
Defendant ultimately turned off of the main street and
into a residential area, braking sharply before the turn (Tr.
156-57).

According to the deputy's radar, defendant accelerated

to 60 miles per hour (Tr. 156-58, 183-84, 186, 218, 244). At
this point, two American Fork sheriff's vehicles joined the chase
(Tr. 244, 252). After a couple of blocks, defendant again braked
sharply and turned, stopping in front of a house less than a
block from the turn (Tr. 157-58, 187, 218-19).

All four police

vehicles pulled up around defendant's vehicle with their lights
and sirens activated (Tr. 158-59, 246-47, 254). Deputy Pickup
spoke to defendant through the closed window on the driver's side
of the Pinto, asking him to step out of the car and explaining
that he was under arrest for the warrant as well as for evading
arrest, failing to stop on the officers' command, and assault
with his vehicle (Tr. 159). Defendant did not roll down the
windows and kept his hands on the door locks (Tr. 159, 220, 231,
247).

Deputy Pickup tried to open the back of the Pinto, but

found the door locked.

He returned to his truck for his "slim

jim" but was unable to use it because defendant kept his hands on
7

the locks (Tr. 159-60, 247) . The deputy again informed defendant
that he was under arrest and that if he did not get out of the
car, the officer would break a window to remove him (Tr. 160,
247).

When defendant refused to respond, the officer used a

special device to break a window farthest away from defendant in
order to minimize the potential for injuries (Tr. 160-61, 221,
247-48).

The officers unlocked and opened the doors, and

defendant stepped from the car (Tr. 161, 248, 254). He was
handcuffed and placed him in the back of Deputy Pickup's car (Tr.
161, 248) . Officer Munson produced a hard copy of the Lehi
warrant, showed it to defendant, then gave it to Deputy Pickup
(Tr. 248-49, 255). Because defendant was not the registered
owner of the Pinto, the car was impounded (Tr. 137-38, 162).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should not consider points 1 through 5 in
defense counsel's brief because, of the six issues presented in
the brief, counsel identifies these points as frivolous.
Further, the entire brief fails to comply with rule 24, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, because it contains no factual
statement, no record citation, and little or no relevant legal
analysis.

This Court should also disregard defendant's pro se

brief because it contains emotional, immaterial, and inadequate
arguments useless to this Court's determination of the
disposition of the case.
Points I (scope of detention) and II (basis for stop):
This Court should not reach the merits of these two points for
8

the additional reasons that they were not"raised below, no
exception to the waiver doctrine is presented on appeal, and the
arguments contain no record citations or meaningful legal
analysis.
Point III (ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel):

Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel should not be reviewed because he fails to meet
the threshold requirements for raising the issue for the first
time on appeal. Moreover, defendant fails to establish either
counsel's deficient performance or any resulting prejudice.
Finally, defendant does not establish the actual conflict
necessary to prevail on his conflict of interest allegation
against both trial and appellate counsel.
Point IV (12-person jury):

This issue was not

preserved below, and counsel's argument lacks record citation,
legal analysis, and supporting authority in violation of rule 24.
Alternatively, defendant's trial by a jury of less than twelve
people is permitted under the Utah Constitution and complies with
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
constitution in Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Point V (impoundment as unlawful bill of attainder):
Defendant failed to raise this issue below, and he provides no
record citation or meaningful legal analysis on appeal.
Moreover, a ruling on the issue will not affect defendant's
conviction or entitle him to the reversal he seeks.

9

Point VI (jury instruction):

Trial counsel did not

challenge any jury instructions below, and the appellate argument
does not comply with rule 24.

Further, the challenged

instruction accurately stated the jury's duty to follow the law
as stated by the court, and its use does not constitute error.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Defendant's counsel has filed a brief containing six
issues, five of which defense counsel admits are without merit
and one which he claims is meritorious.

Brief of Appellant's

Counsel [hereinafter "Appellant's Brief Ifl] at 8-9.

Such a

bifurcated approach to briefing has been explicitly rejected by
this Court.

Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 341 (Utah App.),

cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

Allowing meritless

issues to be brought on appeal "would demonstrate a lack of
confidence in the appellate bar's ability to distinguish between
frivolous and nonfrivolous issues."

Id.

In addition, it would

unnecessarily increase the workload of both court and counsel by
encouraging criminal appellants to present meritless issues
alongside those with obvious merit.

Id.

As the meritless claims

should not have been brought before this Court in the first
place, they should not be considered on appeal.
Moreover, defendant's entire brief fails to meet the
requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The

brief includes no factual statement, and counsel fails to cite to
the record throughout the entire brief.
10

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7)

and (9), and 24(e).

Additionally, the "Statement of Issues"

includes no recitation of the appropriate standards of review and
supporting authority citation for each issue, and the text of the
brief includes only the standard applicable to the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5).

Hence, this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment
below.

Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Utah App. 1991)

(no record citations, legal authority, analysis, or standard of
review and supporting authority); State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204,
208-09 (Utah App. 1991) (no legal analysis or citation to
supporting authorities); State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah
App. 1989) (merits not reached absent citations to the record),
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Koulis v. Standard Oil
Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987) (no concise
statement of facts, citation to the record, or documented
argument); see also State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1989) (no legal analysis or authority to support the analysis);
State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) (no statement of facts
and citation to record).
Additional reasons for refusing to reach the merits of
defendant's various claims are set out in the arguments, infra.
Defendant has filed a pro se brief in addition to his
counsel's brief [hereinafter "Appellant's Brief II"].

The brief

raises numerous claims of error, two of which are included in the
discussions found at Points IV and VI, infra.

Even taking into

account the general allowance granted pro se litigants, see
11

Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.. 820 P.2d 916, 918-19 (Utah
1991) (recognizing that a pro se litigant is not held to
presenting his arguments with the precision of an attorney, but
also cannot expect the Court to become his advocate), the
remaining arguments should be disregarded as they are either
factually insupportable in that they are contrary to the record
evidence or otherwise lack any evidentiary or record support or
citation; are legally insupportable as reversible error in that,
even if error was committed, defendant has failed to establish
that any errors would have substantially affected the outcome of
his case; are devoid of supporting legal analysis; or are wholly
immaterial, emotional, and inaccurate, neither assisting this
Court in disposing of the case nor setting forth any appropriate,
concise challenge as required under rule 24(k).

Koulis, 746 P.2d

at 1184-85; see also State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah
1987); State v. Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 22 (Utah App.
1993) (refusing to address several issues regarding prejudice on
the part of the jury, the court, and the justice system based on
defendant's failure to provide any legal analysis).

Accordingly,

this Court should disregard defendant's pro se brief and assume
the correctness of the decision below.
1184-85.
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See Koulis, 746 P.2d at

POINT I
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF
DEFENDANT'S SCOPE OF DETENTION CLAIM BECAUSE
DEFENSE COUNSEL CONCEDES ITS LACK OF MERIT,
THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, DEFENDANT
ARGUES NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE ARGUMENT CONTAINS NO
RECORD CITATIONS OR MEANINGFUL LEGAL ANALYSIS
In two sentences and one case cite, defendant argues
that the length and scope of his detention exceeded legally
permissible bounds. Appellant's Brief I at 4.

He defines the

detention as extending from the initial traffic stop on county
road 8170 to his ultimate arrest in American Fork and implies
that the detention was unlawful because it exceeded the length
necessary to dispose of the speeding violation.

Id.

In addition to the deficiencies in the briefs addressed
in the Introduction, supra, this Court need not reach the merits
of this issue because defendant failed to raise it below and
makes no effort on appeal to establish either plain error or
exceptional circumstances.2

State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,

917-18 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah
App. 1990) (the Court will generally "not consider an issue, even
a constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for
the first time.11).

Further, the argument contains no record

citations and no meaningful legal analysis.

See Utah R. App. P.

24(a)(7) and (9); see also State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248-50

2

Defendant's ineffective assistance claim for failure to
raise the issue below is addressed at Point III, infra.
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(Utah App. 1992); Hovt, 806 P.2d at 208-09; Ortiz. 782 P.2d at
962.
POINT II
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGE TO THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP FOR THE
ADDITIONAL REASONS THAT THE CLAIM WAS NOT
RAISED BELOW, NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PRESENTED ON
APPEAL, DEFENDANT MISSTATES THE EVIDENCE, AND
THE ARGUMENT LACKS CITATION TO THE RECORD OR
RELEVANT LEGAL ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the initial stop of his car
violated the Fourth Amendment because he was unreasonably stopped
for traveling 43 miles per hour in a 40 mile-per-hour zone.3
Appellant's Brief I at 4-5.
As with Point I, supra, this issue was not preserved
below, and defendant asserts neither plain error nor exceptional
circumstances.4

Sepulveda. 842 P.2d at 917-18; State v.

Robinson. 191 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to
consider the constitutionality of the traffic stop because the
issue was raised for the first time on appeal).

Deputy Pickup

expressly testified that his radar clocked defendant at 53 miles

3

Defendant's argument nominally references the state
constitution, but he presents no independent state constitutional
analysis or citation. Hence, this Court should not reach the state
constitutional challenge. State v. Dudley. 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah
App. 1993); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 n.l (Utah App. 1992),
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d
310, 312 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992);
State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Boone. 820 P.2d 930, 932 n.2 (Utah App. 1991).
4

See Point III, infra, for defendant's assertion of
ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to raise the issue
below.
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per hour in a 40 mile-per-hour zone, and that any earlier
reference to 43 miles per hour was wholly inaccurate (Tr. 16364).

Defendant's argument misstates these facts, fails to cite

to the record, and provides no legal analysis concerning the
reasonableness of the initial stop.
(9).

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) and

Accordingly, the merits of the claim should not be reached.

Christensen. 812 P.2d at 72-73; Hovt, 806 P.2d at 208-09; Ortiz.
782 P.2d at 962.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE INEFFECTIVE
COUNSEL CLAIM FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
WHERE DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS
COUNSEL OF RECORD BELOW; SHOULD THIS COURT
REACHES THE ISSUE, IT WILL FIND THAT
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF
ESTABLISHING BOTH DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE AND
PREJUDICE
Defendant raises for the first time on appeal claims of
ineffective assistance against both his trial and his appellate
counsel.

Appellant's Brief I at 5.
A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can

be raised for the first time on appeal when the record is
adequate to permit determination of the issue and there is new
counsel on appeal.5

State v. Schnoor. 845 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah

App. 1993); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991).
Defendant's appellate counsel was counsel of record below (R. 31,

5

Defendant himself untimely raised an ineffective assistance
argument at trial after both sides had rested their respective
cases (Tr. 264). The court refused to hear the issue at the time
(id.). The claim, involving an alleged conflict of interest, is
addressed at the end of Point III, infra.
15

105).

Addendum B.

Hence, this Court should not entertain

defendant's claims of ineffective trial counsel for the first
time in his direct appeal.
However, as defendant has filed a pro se brief on
appeal and has alleged ineffective assistance, this Court may
choose to reach his ineffectiveness claims.

Even so, the Court

will find that defendant fails to meet his burden of establishing
ineffective assistance.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must first show that his counsel rendered
deficient performance in a demonstrable manner.
770 P.2d 116, 118-19 (Utah 1989).

State v. Verde,

He must establish that the

performance fell below the objective standard of a reasonable
professional and must adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised reasonable professional judgment.
P.2d at 336.

Butterfield. 817

Second, he must establish that a reasonable

probability exists that absent counsel's deficient performance,
the result would have been different.
at 118-19.

Id.: see Verde, 770 P.2d

The deficient performance must be so prejudicial as

to undermine confidence in the reliability of the verdict.
Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 336; £££ Verde, 770 P.2d at 124 n.15.
Failure to establish either prong will defeat the entire claim.
State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); see Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19.
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In this case, defendant fails to meet either prong in
making his ineffectiveness claim against his trial counsel.
While acknowledging the appropriate legal standard, defendant
does not conduct the required analysis.

He identifies as

deficient performance the failure to raise any of the remaining
five substantive errors included in defendant's brief on appeal.
Appellant's Brief I at 5.

He also contends that counsel failed

to spend adequate time with him.
12.

Appellant's Brief II at 5, 11-

However, he does not explain how the alleged omissions fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness.
P.2d at 336.

Butterfield. 817

Similarly, he makes no attempt, either in this

claim or in the separate substantive arguments, to demonstrate
any reasonable probability that either inclusion of any of the
five substantive issues below or an increase in the time spent
with his counsel would have resulted in a different outcome at
trial.

Id.

Accordingly, his claim must fail.

Id.

Defendant also asserts a conflict of interest against
both his appellate and his trial counsel.
5; Appellant's Brief II at 8.

Appellant's Brief I at

The conflict allegedly arises

because counsel's efforts on defendant's behalf are funded
through the county by means of a contract with the public
defenders office.
A conflict of interest claim is analyzed under a
different standard than other ineffectiveness claims. When a
defendant raises a conflict of interest for the first time on
appeal, he must demonstrate with specificity that "'an actual
17

conflict of interest exist[s] which adversely affect [s] his. . .
lawyer'-s performance.'"

See Webb, 790 P.2d at 73 (quoting Cuyler

v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); see also Johnson, 823
P.2d at 488. When such a showing is made, prejudice will be
presumed.

Johnson, 823 P.2d at 488.
Defendant establishes no actual conflict, relying

instead on a novel assertion of an inherent conflict.

He offers

no support for this assertion and no alternative by which to
satisfy his continued demand for counsel without involving this
inherent "conflict."

Accordingly, he has not established that

either appellate or trial counsel is ineffective.
POINT IV
IN ADDITION TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CONCESSION
THAT THE ISSUE INVOLVING A 12-PERSON JURY IS
MERITLESS, THIS COURT MAY REFUSE TO ADDRESS
THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
PRESERVED BELOW, NO EXCEPTION TO THE WAIVER
DOCTRINE IS ADVANCED ON APPEAL, AND NO
SUPPORTING RECORD CITATION OR LEGAL ANALYSIS
AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY IS PROVIDED;
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE "TRIAL
BY JURY" TO WHICH HE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENTITLED
Defendant argues that his trial by an eight-person jury
instead of a twelve-man jury harboring beliefs similar to his
deprived him of his sixth amendment right to "trial by jury".
Appellant's Brief I at 6; Appellant's Brief II at 2, 14-18.
In addition to the briefing deficiencies outlined in
the Introduction, supra, this Court need not reach this issue
because it was not raised below, and defendant fails to argue
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either plain error or exceptional circumstances.6

Sepulveda,

842 P.2d at 917-18/ Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435. Additionally, the
argument contains no citation to the record and no legal analysis
or authority supporting the claim, in violation of rule 24(a)(7)
and (9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Hovt, 806 P.2d at

208-09; Ortiz, 782 P.2d at 962; Koulis, 746 P.2d at 1184-85; see
also Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966.
Defendant's pro se brief includes a detailed argument
on this issue. Appellant's Brief II at 14-18.

In view of the

leniency afforded pro se defendants on appeal, see Winter, 820
P.2d at 919-20, this Court may choose to reach the merits of the
issue.

Therefore, the State briefly addresses the claim.
As defendant recognizes, at common law a jury was

required to be comprised of twelve men.
14-15.

Appellant's Brief II at

However, the United States Supreme Court has determined

that the Federal Constitution does not codify the common law
requirement of a 12-person jury.
78, 86-103 (1970).

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.

To the contrary, it has held that "the 12-man

panel is not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury,'" and that
a jury by fewer than twelve, when provided for by state law, does
not violate the Sixth Amendment.

Id., 399 U.S. at 86.

In this

case, defendant was tried before an eight-person jury, as
provided for by article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, he received the "trial by jury" to which the federal

6

His claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to
preserve the issue is addressed in Point III, supra.
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constitution entitles him, and his argument must fail.

Id.

Moreover, his state constitutional right to a jury trial was
fulfilled as well.

See State v. Nuttall. 611 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah

1980) (affirming a misdemeanor conviction before a jury of less
than twelve pursuant to article I, section 10 of the Utah
Constitution).
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT IMPOUNDMENT OF HIS
VEHICLE CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL BILL OF
ATTAINDER IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, NO EXCEPTION
TO THE WAIVER DOCTRINE IS URGED ON APPEAL,
AND NO RECORD CITATION OR SUPPORTING LEGAL
ANALYSIS APPEARS IN THE BRIEF; ADDITIONALLY,
A RULING ON THIS ISSUE WILL NOT AFFECT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OR ENTITLE HIM TO HIS
REQUESTED RELIEF
A bill of attainder is a law which "imposes guilt, and
inflicts punishment, upon an identifiable individual or group
without judicial process.11

Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County

Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1147 (Utah 1981); §ee Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services. 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
Defendant contends that the impounding of his car constitutes an
unlawful bill of attainder because he was required to pay a fine
to get the car back without any judicial declaration of guilt.
Appellant's Brief I at 6.

In addition, defendant's pro se brief

claims that the breaking of the car window and his incarceration
for 22 days under the imposition of "excessive11 bail constitute
unlawful bills of attainder.

Appellant's Brief II at 1, 10-11.

Once again, this issue was not preserved below, and
defendant argues neither plain error nor exceptional
20

circumstances.7

Neither brief provides any legal analysis or

citation to the record.

Accordingly, this Court should decline

to reach the merits of the claims.

Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917-

18; Webb, 790 P.2d at 77; Hoyt. 806 P.2d at 208-09; Ortiz, 782
P.2d at 962.
Furthermore, defendant seeks only reversal of his
conviction.
20.

Appellant's Brief I at 9; Appellant's Brief II at

Assuming, arguendo, that this issue could be resolved in

defendant's favor, he would not be entitled to the requested
relief because his conviction was obtained independent of the
impounding of his car, the breaking of its window, or the
imposition of bail.
POINT VI
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGE TO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS IT WAS
NOT PRESERVED BELOW, MANIFEST INJUSTICE IS
NOT ARGUED ON APPEAL, AND NO RECORD CITATIONS
OR STANDARD OF REVIEW APPEAR IN THE BRIEFS;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE JURY INSTRUCTION
ACCURATELY STATED THE DUTY OF THE JURY TO
FOLLOW THE LAW AS STATED BY THE COURT, AND
ITS USE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ERROR
Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury that it was required to follow the law as
given to it by the court.

Appellant's Brief I at 7-8;

Appellant's Brief II at 19-20. He contends that the instruction
essentially directed the jury that it was "bound by the law" and

7

His ineffective assistance claim on this issue is addressed
in Point III, supra.
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had to find him guilty.

Appellant's Brief I at 7-8; Appellant's

Brief II at 19-20.
Once again, this issue was not preserved below, and
defendant does not establish any manifest injustice to enable
this Court to reach the merits of his claim on appeal.8

State

v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990); £ee also Utah R.
Crim. P- 19(c) (requiring that the grounds of any objection to
jury instructions be stated with specificity).

The arguments in

both briefs are devoid of record citations and statements of the
appropriate standard of review.

Hence, this Court need not reach

the merits of defendant's claim.

Christensen. 812 P.2d at 72-

73.
In the event this Court grants defendant leniency to
raise this issue for the first time on appeal based on the legal
analysis in his pro se brief, Winter, 820 P.2d at 919-20, it will
find defendant's position contrary to current law.
This Court will reverse based on an improper jury
instruction only where defendant demonstrates prejudice stemming
from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.

State v. Haston,

811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd. on other grounds. 846
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah
1980), abrogated on other grounds. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774
(Utah 1991)•

The precise wording and specificity contained in an

8

Trial counsel expressly said that he had no objections to
any of the jury instructions (Tr. 262), and defendant only
generally objected to the giving of any jury instruction as
constituting jury tampering (Tr. 265-66). See Point III, supra,
for defendant's ineffective assistance claim.
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instruction is left to the trial court's sound discretion, so
long as the instruction does not misstate material rules of law.
State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
Jury Instruction Number 1, to which defendant objects,
provided:
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you
in the law that applies to this case, and it
is your duty as jurors to follow the law as
the Court states it to you, regardless of
what you personally believe the law is or
ought to be. On the other hand it is your
exclusive province to determine the facts in
the case, and to consider and weigh the
evidence for that purpose.
(R. 78). Addendum C.
Defendant correctly recognizes the judge's right and
duty to instruct the jury on the correct law to be followed.
Sparf and Hansen v. United States. 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895); see
generally United States v. Washington. 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).

He admits that the judge has no duty to give an

instruction to the contrary, but asserts that the challenged
instruction in this case should have been omitted.

Appellant's

Brief I at 7.
Defendant relies on dicta in United States v. Moylan.
417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert, denied. 397 U.S. 910 (1970),
to establish "the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if
its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and
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contrary to the evidence."9

Id., 397 U.S. at 1006.

This

language recognizes that once a jury enters deliberations, it may
choose to acquit in disregard of the law or the evidence, and
because they render a nonreviewable general verdict, the
acquittal must stand.
The United States Supreme Court has contrasted this
ability to disregard the law with the right to do so, indicating
that juries enjoy the former power but not the latter right.

In

Sparf and Hansen v. United States. 156 U.S. 57 (1895), the Court
upheld the validity of jury instructions concerning the jury's
obligation to apply the law to the facts, stating:
Public and private safety alike would be
in peril if the principle be established that
juries in criminal cases may of right
disregard the law as expounded to them by the
court and become a law unto themselves.
Under such a system, the principal function
of the judge would be to preside and keep
order while jurymen, untrained in the law,
would determine questions affecting life,
liberty, or property according to such legal
principles as in their judgment were
applicable to the particular case being
tried. . . . Upon the court rests the
responsibility of declaring the law: upon the
jury, the responsibility of applying the law
so declared to the facts as thev. upon their
conscience, believe them to be. Under any
other system, the courts, although
established in order to declare the law,
would for every practical purpose be
eliminated from our system of government as
instrumentalities devised for the protection
equally of society and of individuals in the
essential rights. When that occurs our
government will cease to be a government of
9

Moylan established that defendants are not entitled to an
instruction informing the jury of their ability to acquit without
regard to the law or the evidence.
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laws, and become a government of men.
Liberty regulated by law is the underlying
principle of our instructions.
Id.. 156 U.S. at 101-03 (emphasis added).
The distinction between the jury's ability to acquit
contrary to the law simply because deliberations are'
nonreviewable and the non-existent right to do so is wellrecognized in other jurisdictions.

See United States v. Avery.

717 F.2d 1020, 1027 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Although jurors may indeed
have the power to ignore the law, their duty is to apply the law
as interpreted by the court and they should be so instructed"),
cert, denied. 466 U.S. 905 (1984); Washington. 705 F.2d at 494
("A jury has no more 'right' to find a 'guilty' defendant 'not
guilty' than it has to find a 'not guilty' defendant guilty,' and
the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while
the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to
misapply the law.

Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due

process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.
Any arguably salutary functions served by inexplicable jury
acquittals would be lost if that prerogative were frequently
exercised; indeed, calling attention to that power could
encourage the substitution of individual standards for openly
developed community rules"); United States v. Coupez. 603 F.2d
1347, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that although "'"jurors
may have the power to ignore the law, . . . their duty is to
apply the law as interpreted by the court, and they should be so
instructed."'") (citations omitted).
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The instruction in this case did no more than correctly
explain to the jury their duty.

Therefore, defendant has not

established any error in the court's use of the instruction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and
*

sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^fy

day of September,

1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorned General

US C. LEON/
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Cleve
J. Hatch, Utah county Public Defender Assoc, attorney for
appellant, 40 South 100 West, Suite 200, Provo, Utah
of September, 1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah
369, 86 P.2d 37 (1939).

41-6-14

Cited in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d
981 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic i 19.

C.J.S. — 60 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles *» 10.

41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop —
Fleeing — Traveling at excessive speeds or causing property damage or bodily injury — Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts tofleeor elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing: (a) travels
in excess of 30 miles per hour above the posted speed limit; (b) causes damage
to the property of another or bodily iiyury to another; or (c) leaves the state, is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.5, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 33, 5 38; L. 1981, ch. 269, § 1; 1987,
ch. 138, J 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment in Subsection (1)9 substituted "peace officer" for "police officer near the beginning of
the subsection and near the end substituted "a
peace office by vehicle or other means is" for
"the police shall be"; in Subsection (2) designated the previously undesignated clauses and

in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "30 miles per
hour above the posted speed limit" for "90
miles per hour"; and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Applicability of traffic law
to highway work vehicles — Exemptions.
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2).
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing
down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger
life or property; or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning
in specified directions.
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section
.41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is
visible from in front of the vehicle.
393

PART 3
OBSTRUCTING GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made bv a neace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
History: C. 1353, 76-8-305, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 82, | lj 1990, ch. 274, S 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted

"that person" for "himself in the introductory
language, added the subsection designation (1),
added Subsections (2) and (3), and made stylistic changes.
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CLEVE J. HATCH (5609)
PUBLIC DEFENDERS INC.
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone 374-1212

AM

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—

STATE OF UTAH,

f

MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

Plaintiff,

Case No. 921400096

vs.
JAMES C. QUADA,
Defendant.
Comes now, James C. Quada, by and through his counsel of record,
Public Defenders Inc. Cleve J. Hatch, and requests that trial in this
matter be continued from the August 17, 18, 1992 date on which it has
now been continued to, for the reason that Mr. Hatch has another trial
in district court set for those days and that defendant is in custody,
in the Utah County Jail.
Respectfully submitted this, La

day of August, 1992.

Cleve J Hatch

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion, postage prepaid, to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center
Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606, this

day of August, 199 2>.

^ /I^A MSA.

JrSA

'&

case today.

If that is the case then we might ask you to

stay into the evening to make your decision.
appears

If not, if it

we can't get the case on we will come back tomorrow

and spend another day at it.

I will give you your choice.

When we get down there and it looks like we are going to get
through with the testimony and the case winds up, if you
want to stay and finish it we will let that be a choice
that you can make.

Otherwise you can come back tomorrow.

Okay, we will excuse you then.
(WHEREUPON, the jury was excused to go with the bailiff)
THE COURT:

Mr. Musselman did you want to make

a motion?
MR. MUSSELMAN:

Yes, Your Honor.

The court , of

course, is aware that we filed a few weeks ago a written
motion to continue this matter for a number of reasons
one of which was that Mr. Hatch has been the attorney
responsible for this case.

He is involved in a case before

Judge Harding at this particular time.

We argued that

at the pre-trial conference and the court made its ruling
and denying that motion.

I don't wish to argue with the

court's ruling but simply to call the court's attention that
Mr. Quada has informed me this morning that he feels that
he is unprepared to proceed.

He feels that he had less then

adequate time to consult with the attorney who is trying the
case, namely myself.

He has asked me that I allow him to

5

ADDENDUM C

0

FILED
Fourth Judiclil District Court
of Utah County, Stat* ot Utah
CARMAB. SMITH, Clark

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

STATE OF UTAH

Case No.: 921400096

Plaintiff,
-vs-

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

JAMES C. QUADA
Defendant.
**********

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the law
that applies to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to
follow the law as the Court states it to you, regardless of
what you personally believe the law is or ought to be.

On the

other hand, it is your exclusive province to determine the
facts in the case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for
that purpose.
The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary
power, but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound
discretion, and in accordance with rules of law stated to you.

